Development in the Atlantic: Between cooperation and competition

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ABSTRACT

This paper offers an analysis of the changing nature of development cooperation and its potential for innovation in the Atlantic sphere, particularly under the consideration of a stronger and more assertive role of southern actors. Development cooperation is indicative of broader shifts in political, economic, and cultural clout and key elements of the global aid architecture are adapting a new reality. In light of South-South Cooperation’s emergence as an alternative to traditional aid, the analysis of cooperation in the Atlantic Basin points to an increasingly diverse global South. The diversity, in turn could position the Atlantic as a laboratory for innovative approaches to development cooperation. In the foreseeable future, interaction among Atlantic development partners, whether through cooperation, coordination, or competition, is unlikely to be crystalized into a new institutional set-up but will rather become the sum of dynamic and flexible arrangements reflecting the diversity of actors, interests, and strategies.
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1. Introduction

The past decade has seen a broad rebalancing of power and a growing assertiveness of the global South. In the case of development cooperation, the Atlantic basin\(^1\) provides an interesting space within which the apparent dichotomy between North and South is brought into perspective. The diversity of development partners across the basin points to more nuanced and complex relations in the realm of development cooperation. In this context, the Atlantic basin appears as a potential laboratory for innovative approaches to development cooperation. The Atlantic space has the particularity of bringing together the whole spectrum of development actors from traditional donors, which still make up three fourths of global development aid, to emerging powers and status quo middle-income countries, and least developed countries (LDCs). In turn, development cooperation is indicative of broader shifts in political, economic, and cultural clout. The growing recognition of these countries’ weight in matters of development and the novel models of southern actors are changing the reality of aid cooperation and adding to its complexity.

As South-South cooperation (SSC) changes the development cooperation status quo in the Atlantic basin, this paper will provide a broad overview of key changes and trends in development cooperation in the past decade. The paper will go on to assess the main tenets of South-South cooperation and how Atlantic re-emerging development partners articulate their development cooperation. In addition to different concepts, sectors, and mechanisms for providing development aid, traditional donors and southern cooperation providers differ on terminology. The distinction is often made between DAC and non-DAC donors, which is somewhat problematic as the DAC is used as the reference point. Emerging donors is also used, although this term obscures the long-standing experience of many of these countries as providers of development assistance. In addition, most southern providers do not define their relationships as donor-recipient but rather as partnerships. The terms re-emerging development partners and South-South cooperation providers will be used in this paper (Davies 2008, Mawdsley 2012).

Southern cooperation, while remaining more diffuse than the highly institutionalized northern development aid, has experienced a tremendous resurgence in recent years, with implications for traditional donors and recipient countries alike. Re-emerging development partners are among the drivers of change in key trends in development cooperation, notably the pressures to depart from strict definitions of official development aid (ODA)\(^2\) more integrated approaches linking development policy to foreign policy, trade and investment, and rethinking the respective roles of the public and private sectors (Mawdsley 2012). As Northern development models and South-South cooperation increasingly intersect, entrenched hierarchies in development cooperation are renegotiated. Institutional and policy changes over the past decade point to overall trends whose direction is not yet set in stone.

\(^1\) The Atlantic basin includes countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean, direct coastline countries in the Caribbean, the EU-27 and Switzerland.

\(^2\) Following the DAC official definitions, official development aid refers to “Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in general not counted.” DAC Glossary - [http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#ODA](http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#ODA)
While the global development community encompasses a wide range of actors from multilateral organizations, to national governments, to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the focus will be on state-led cooperation, with a particular emphasis of actors in the Atlantic basin. The growing importance of NGOs, in particular foundations and charities in the United States, is also contributing to changes in development cooperation. These, however, remain predominantly based in the North Atlantic, with very few counterparts in the South Atlantic, and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, data collection remains a critical challenge for the quantitative assessment of these trends.

### 2. Development cooperation in the Atlantic

The DAC, formerly Development Assistance Group (DAG), was established in 1961 with the Resolution of the Common Aid Effort passed by the DAG's eleven members, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Economic Community. The committee’s original mandate was to “consult on the methods for making national resources available for assisting countries and areas in the process of economic development and for expanding and improving the flow of long-term funds and other development assistance to them” (OECD 2006). While other multilateral forums, ranging from the United Nations’ Development Cooperation Forum to the IMF and the World Bank are key pieces of the international aid architecture, the DAC is largely recognized as having produced the most far reaching and coherent set of standards, guidelines, principles, definitions, and data on development cooperation (Bräutigam 2010, Chaturvedi et al. 2012).

As a central part of the global aid architecture, the DAC has seen significant change over the past decade as a result on the one hand of increased criticism and, on the other, of greater competition with new and re-emerging development actors. Widespread disillusion permeated the early to mid-2000s as recipient countries rejected the donor ‘consensus’ of the previous 25 years, seeing conditions attached to aid as misaligned with their national priorities. Conditionality, or demands by donors for political and economic reform in recipient countries in exchange for aid, a central component of traditional donor’s aid delivery, has borne the brunt of the criticism. Donors in turn have treated criticism of conditionalties by recipient countries and civil society actors as “unwarranted complaints of patients unwilling to take medicine which is good for them” (Woods 2008, 1217). The adverse effects of aid on recipient countries, most notably dependency whereby states rely on aid for revenue rather than other sources such as economic growth or taxation, undermining their autonomy and independence, have also come under fire from recipient countries, NGOs, and commentators (e.g. Easterly 2006, Glennie 2008, Moyo 2009). Governments and publics of DAC donor countries have also grown skeptical of the value of development aid, an attitude which continued to gain ground in the wake of the financial crisis. Persisting global poverty and the failure of aid to generate sustained economic growth has called into question the aid effectiveness paradigm and the legitimacy of the global aid governance architecture (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012).

Donor countries outside of the Development Assistance Committee are becoming increasingly central to delivering aid to and forging partnerships with developing countries. While debates within the DAC and other nodes of the development architecture are closely linked to the rise of China, Atlantic basin countries such as Brazil, South Africa, or Venezuela are also among the re-emerging development partners. Most development partners outside the committee have long-standing experience in development cooperation and, Manning (2006), former chair of the DAC,
argues that some degree of competition or at least co-existence has always existed between DAC members and non-DAC development partners (Manning 2006, Davies 2010, Mawdsley 2011).

From the early 2000s the DAC progressively shifted from a failure to recognize the activities of a growing range of Southern and non-DAC development actors to a policy of outreach to enhanced engagement to a global relations strategy and building partnerships. The DAC has actively tried to build, and in some cases rebuild, relationships with re-emerging development partners (Manning 2006, OECD 2011a, OECD 2011b, Mawdsley 2012). Glennie sees a direct link between the first two principles of the Paris Declaration\(^3\), ownership and alignment, and efforts by the DAC to move beyond the “post-colonial client relationship which the OECD embodies” (2011, 4). The degree to which institutions such as the DAC have conceded ground to new approaches to development cooperation is contested. Efforts by the DAC to engage with and learn about South-South cooperation also reflect the DAC’s endeavor to maintain a degree of influence over the norms, practices, and international architecture of development cooperation in the face of increased “competitive pressures” by South-South providers (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013, 1479).

While the DAC is proactively engaging with re-emerging development partners, national strategies point to a slower adaptation on the part of traditional donors. Recognizing the drastic changes that the foreign assistance landscape has undergone, traditional donors are discussing broadening their approach to development cooperation to include policy areas ranging from trade and investment, to immigration, and environmental policy, and tools other than official development aid. In addition, debates on how to engage re-emerging development partners accompany the more general question of how to rethink development cooperation with a growing number of middle-income countries (MICs)\(^4\). In this context, key donors in the North Atlantic have started looking south through new lenses and develop strategies for systematic engagement with these actors.

Changes on the part of traditional donors and the broadening of the global aid architecture have interacted with and prompted different strategies within the global South. The High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development organized in Bogota in March 2010 by the DAC-anchored Task Team on South-South cooperation revealed these, at times, conflicting strategies and aims. During the event, rising powers, in particular Brazil, China, and India, blocked the adoption of a common declaration. The three countries feared that a common declaration in a forum within which the DAC-hosted task team played a major role, rather than in the framework of the UN, might later restrict their political spaces within South-South cooperation. In response, a frustrated steering committee, including a significant number of southern providers\(^5\), endorsed the Bogota statement with very limited reference to discussions in

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\(^{3}\) The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed by 91 recipient and donor countries, 26 multilateral donors (regional and international organizations), and 14 civil society observers, aimed at realigning donor and recipient country priorities.

\(^{4}\) Classifications of Middle Income Countries (MICs) vary. In addition to China, Atlantic basin upper middle income on both the World Bank and the OECD classifications include Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Namibia, Panama, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Keizer et al. 2014, 156-157). Development cooperation with these countries is increasingly under scrutiny as part of the debates on how to adapt current aid policies.

\(^{5}\) “The Steering Committee members of the Bogota High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development are Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
the framework of the UN. A set of broad ‘peer groups’ appear within the global South, ranging from rising powers to middle-income countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Turkey, less reluctant to work within the framework of the DAC, to poorer and smaller countries (Chaturvedi et al. 2012). Countries within these peer groups choose platforms for cooperation and dialogue ranging from the DAC, to the G20, to the G77, to UN forums. The multiplicity of these platforms, the goals pursued through them, and the ability of some countries to operate within multiple forums reflect the complexity of the global South.

The 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, and the ensuing Busan Partnership Document (BPD) is seen as the turning point from a discussion of ‘aid effectiveness’ to a conversation about ‘development effectiveness’, departing from the hitherto restrictive definition of ODA to ‘development finance’, closer to the more inclusive understanding of development cooperation by re-emerging development partners (Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013, Mawdsley et al. 2013). Although traditional and re-emerging donors, primarily Brazil, China, and India, found common ground at Busan, recipient countries, in particular the African ‘sherpas’, insisted on including a recommitment to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action. While South-South cooperation presents new opportunities, partner countries have stressed the importance of the Paris Declaration as a means of managing the growing number of aid providers, seeking to hold donors, old and new, to account and to clarify processes and structures of development cooperation (Mawdsley et al. 2013). The increased complexity of aid and the capacity constraints of national agencies are among the challenges identified by partner countries. They have also voiced concerns regarding the lack of transparency and the limited information available on the terms and conditions of cooperation with South-South providers (Davies 2008, Kragelund 2011, Mawdsley et al. 2013). Given the complexity of the global South, major emerging powers do not and cannot represent the interests of the world’s poorest countries.

Countries of the Atlantic basin are deeply concerned by debates on the changing global aid architecture. While traditional donors and southern providers are often depicted as belonging to two coherent camps, a look at the Atlantic brings out some of the nuances of current development cooperation.

The often-touted historical and cultural links across the basin present both opportunities and challenges, which should be taken into account when engaging in cooperation. In addition to shared languages, the history of colonization has, among others, impacted the development of institutions across the basin, often leading to some degree of similarity in the formal set-up of these institutions. While existing links can facilitate cooperation, these often come with assumptions of the degree of closeness and a false sense of naturally aligned interests, methods, and ways of communicating. Assumptions of hierarchies, often linked to the basin’s history, also remain present in the minds of policymakers, private sector actors, and publics alike. Though not devoid of their own preconceptions, donors and South-South providers from outside the region, such as Japan or Indonesia, might find it easier to create new relationships with countries in the Atlantic, while Atlantic basin countries struggle to see each other through new lenses.

Mozambique, Peru, Spain, Thailand, Vietnam, Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Better Aid, European Commission (EC), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), NEPAD, Organization of American States (OAS), OCDE, UNDP and the World Bank.” (Bogota Statement 2010).

Sherpas are the nominated representatives of clusters of actors (Mawdsley et al. 2013, 30).
Although the Atlantic is not an explicit focus area for Northern donors, the cumulative activity of North Atlantic traditional donors and South Atlantic re-emerging development partners is immense. As the latter continues to increase, the Atlantic space will continue to shrink. While some rebalancing is occurring, due in part to budget constraints and development fatigue in the North, donors like the US, the EU, and its member states, are far from gone. Given the diversity of players around the Atlantic, the basin could give rise to new strategies for competition and cooperation. The following section provides a closer look at the main tenets and articulations of South-South cooperation and strategies of actors in the Atlantic basin.

3. Re-emerging South-South Cooperation

Although the concept is not new, sustained economic growth in emerging economies and the subsequent increased reach of their development cooperation, at a time when North-South flows have slowed, has revived interest in South-South cooperation (Woods 2008). The concept of South-South cooperation is as much about the actors as it is about the approaches, methods, and justifications. Indeed, most forms of development cooperation undertaken by states of the global South fall under the umbrella that is South-South cooperation. Southern development actors make up a diverse group with, at times, contradictory approaches and interests. The types of relationships between South-South providers and their different partners are extremely varied.

South-South development cooperation has historically been a looser concept than traditional development aid. Such cooperation is generally implemented through technical assistance at the project level and has maintained an inclusive definition of what constitutes development cooperation, combining commercial transactions such as preferential export credits with elements closer to western definitions of official development aid like grants, loans falling under ODA requirements, debt relief, or technical assistance. The integrated approach, which combines trade, investment, and loans with support in areas such as education, health, and infrastructural aid programs, is unique to southern development cooperation (Davies 2008, Bräutigam 2010, Chaturvedi 2012). The commercial element is indeed prevalent in southern cooperation.

Aid from re-emerging development partners is generally far less fragmented than aid from traditional donors, choosing to focus on a limited number of sectors and projects per country (Woods 2011). Many official South-South flows are linked to these countries’ trade and investment activities and these aid flows are often channeled through import-export banks rather than national development agencies, further complicating the disaggregation of development assistance from other commercial flows (Woods 2008, Kragelund 2011, Schoeman 2011). Mawdsley argues that much of the criticism of South-South cooperation stem from a category error, whereby southern flows are judged by standards official development aid (2011). Estimates on aid flows from re-emerging development partners also vary immensely because many countries, including Brazil, China, and India do not officially report aid flows. Funding from South-South providers has, however, grown rapidly over the past decade and these countries are taking on an increasingly important role in the international aid architecture (Davies 2008, Woods 2008, Bilal et al. 2012, Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013).

The revival of South-South cooperation is also the product of more self-confident leadership in many emerging countries. Countries like Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, which have become strong political leaders in their regions also work together in
forums like the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum launched in 2003 or the less formal BRICS Forum (Abdenur 2007, Alden et al. 2010, De Sa e Silva 2010). The IBSA Forum placed a strong emphasis on development from the beginning while the BRICS nations have decided on the creation of a BRICS Development Bank as an alternative to existing structures like the World Bank (Al Doyaili et al. 2013, Dube 2013).

International organizations and northern bilateral agencies significantly supported and financed the expansion of South-South cooperation starting in the late 1990s, facilitating the emergence of networks among Southern countries. Support for southern cooperation has in turn helped international organizations and traditional donors redefine their role and mission, adding legitimacy to their policies (Abdenur 2007, Kharas 2007, De Sa e Silva 2010). Indeed, the resurgence of southern cooperation took place at a time of growing discontent towards traditional forms of aid, with South-South cooperation appearing as a valid alternative. Many recipients of southern aid welcome its flexibility. In addition, Southern providers defend the primacy of national sovereignty, preferring non-interference to the political conditionalities advocated by traditional donors (Chaturvedi et al. 2012). Despite fears in the North of displacement, the focus of southern providers has largely been on sectors traditional donors have has moved away from, such as agriculture, infrastructure, or health care (Severino and Ray 2011).

Like all other states, countries of the global South use development cooperation as a foreign policy tool. As Sidiropoulos points out, “SSC is not inherently good for beneficiaries, or more power-symmetrical” (2012) simply because the actors are part of the global South and present an alternative to hitherto dominant models of aid. Projections of national interests and the specific interests of funding countries drive the provision of southern development cooperation. Economic and diplomatic considerations inform the choice of recipients to the type of cooperation. Contrary to the discourse of most traditional donors, national interests are explicitly put at the core of justifications for South-South cooperation (Ladd 2010, Bilal et al. 2012). Evidence shows that foreign aid delivered by DAC donors is also allocated according political and strategic interests. An equivalent shift in discourse and justification of aid, however, has not yet taken place in the North, with an enduring sense in the northern development community that the aim of development cooperation is a moral one of assisting the poor (Rowlands 2008).

Whereas traditional donors have long used a discourse of charity, altruism, and compassion to justify development aid, South-South providers frame their decisions in terms of solidarity, mutual benefit, and shared identities. Re-emerging development partners will highlight the shared experience of colonialism, of post-colonial inequality, and the current imbalances in the global system. On the basis of this shared identity as developing countries, South-South providers reject the hierarchy inherent to the donor-recipient relationship, emphasizing mutual respect and equality. These have become tropes for leaders of southern states and are used to frame speeches, high-level meetings, or forums. Self-reliance and self-help, two core principles of southern development cooperation, are also articulated in South-South providers’ insistence on the win-win outcomes of southern cooperation (Chaturvedi 2012). Words matter and, unlike the unreciprocated gift and unequal relationship that Northern aid represents, the discourse of southern providers restores the dignity of recipient states, establishing them as actors in a partnership rather than passive recipients (Mawdsley 2011). South-South cooperation is a quid pro quo in which recipient countries present clear economic opportunities for their partners.

Triangular development cooperation has emerged as the main instrument at the intersection of northern and southern development cooperation. This form of
cooperation, as defined in a joint document by Japan and UNDP in 1999\(^7\), is a mechanism by which northern development actors can support South-South cooperation, acting as a bridge between South-South and North-South cooperation (Abdenur 2007, Bogota Statement 2010). DAC donors or multilateral agencies work with so-called ‘pivotal’ countries, such as Brazil or South Africa, on projects implemented in ‘partner’ or recipient countries, like Angola and Cameroon. Northern contributions for triangular cooperation projects are generally financial while pivotal countries provide technical skills. Such projects assume that pivotal countries are better able to transfer technologies and make use of innovative approaches and localized knowledge based on shared experiences or geographical, cultural, and socio-economic similarities (Abdenur 2007, Davies 2008, McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). In addition to North-South-South cooperation, South-South-South cooperation has advanced in recent years to projects between countries like Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique or Zambia, Benin, and Mozambique. Latin American countries are also increasingly using triangular arrangements (Chaturvedi 2012)\(^8\). Triangular cooperation also boasts increasingly diverse stakeholders, with non-state actors engaging it through partnerships with other non-state organization or ‘hybrid’ partnerships with government agencies (Davies 2008, Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013).

Countries, which have acted as regional nodes of cooperation, like Brazil, India or South Africa, have used triangular cooperation to strengthen South-South transfer networks and advance broader regional and global goals. Triangular cooperation has been a tool for national self-promotion for re-emerging development partners and has enabled traditional donors to gain legitimacy and redefine their role as ‘brokers’ and ‘bridge-builders’. Such arrangements also provide a platform for Northern and Southern development providers to engage on issues of norms, practices, and regulation (Abdenur 2007, McEwan and Mawdsley 2012, Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013).

Current debates about southern cooperation focus on the ability of the current aid architecture to bend and accommodate re-emerging development partners. Much of the emphasis in the discussion on South-South cooperation has been placed on the relationship between traditional donors or multilateral organizations and pivotal countries, with some reluctance to address the uneven power relations within the global South. Links between pivotal and partner countries are often presented as ‘natural’ alliances. The shared priorities, interests, and experiences promoted by southern cooperation obscure the fact that the South is by no means a monolith and that significant power hierarchies, cultural differences, and interests exist across the global South (Davies 2008, Alden et al. 2010).

\(^7\) UNDP/Japan definition of TDC in Abdenur 2007: “Triangular South-South cooperation is becoming increasingly popular as a way of fostering development by leveraging the best features of cooperation between developing countries with assistance from developed countries. A Triangular South-South cooperation activity can be the initiative of one or more Southern countries that wish to cooperate with one another. In order to maximize their financial, logistical and technical resources, such countries can ask for the support of a Northern donor as a third partner. Alternatively, a donor can partner with a developing country willing to provide technical cooperation to other Southern partners and whose initiative will make triangular cooperation the Northern donor’s priorities and interests. The Northern donor would then offer to support South-South cooperation through a triangular approach by providing financial and/or technical support. (UNDP, 1999).”

\(^8\) For examples of TDC including, among others Atlantic countries, see Annex B: Triangular cooperation projects (Fordelone 2011, 21-24).
An ethnographic study on triangular partnerships showed that Brazilian development workers in Mozambique are criticized for the same superior attitudes western aid workers have long been guilty of. Southern development actors are no more immune to the attitudes that donor status seems to bring out than their Northern counterparts. They too seek greater national recognition through their development cooperation (Mawdsley 2011, McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). As their presence in recipient, mostly African, countries increases, the methods and attitudes of Southern development partners have also come under harsh criticism. Chinese and Indian investments in Southern Africa have renewed discussions in countries like Botswana or Zambia on indigenization and economic empowerment policies9. Across the Atlantic, Stuenkel points out that despite Brazil’s insistence on its identity as the largest ‘African’ country outside of Africa, African observers are often puzzled by how few black Brazilians are part of the country’s elite (2013). The rhetoric of partnership and win-win arrangements will be increasingly put to the test as differences continue to grow within the global South.

4. Re-emerging Development Partners in the Atlantic

The most active southern development partners in the Atlantic are middle-income countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela (Manning 2006, Kharas 2007, Sanahuja 2010, Fordelone 2011). In recent years, Chile has developed the capacity to deliver bilateral aid programs in the region. The country has also played an active role in international debates on innovative sources of development finance (Manning 2006). Following the path of other Latin American countries, transitioning from aid recipient to aid donor, Mexico established the Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID) in 2011. AMEXCID’s main purpose is coordinating federal institutions, research centers in Mexico and external partners engaged in development cooperation (Romero 2012). Whereas Mexico has entered in trilateral cooperation with DAC member states, primarily Germany, Spain, and Japan, to enhance it development cooperation capacity, Venezuela has steered clear of such arrangements, preferring bilateral cooperation or multilateral channels like the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID). Venezuela, especially under the leadership of President Hugo Chavez, openly rejected cooperation with traditional donors, using development cooperation as a tool of the “Bolivarian Revolution”. As such, aid from Venezuela went principally to countries seen as embracing similar socio-political visions such as Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Venezuela’s switch from the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank to southern-led institutions like OFID and the Banco del Sur10 aimed to challenge established hierarchies within the international development architecture (Manning 2006, Woods 2008, Chahoud 2008, Romero 2012).

While most re-emerging development partners in the South Atlantic focus their aid on their immediate region, Brazil and South Africa stand out as regional development nodes with significant direct, and indirect, impact on international debates on

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development cooperation and articulated national strategies for development cooperation. Development cooperation has historically been a central principle of Brazil’s foreign policy and gained particular prominence from the early 2000s under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). Both President Lula’s and current President Dilma Rousseff’s administrations actively promoted Brazil as a legitimate and innovative development partner by building coalitions within the global South and contributing to multilateral organizations\(^{11}\) (Kragelund 2008, John de Sousa 2010, Dauvergne and Farias 2012). Although Brazil shares basic values with traditional donors, such as representative democracy and the protection of human rights, these are seen as domestic issues for nation states to contend with, which serves to justify Brazil’s non-interventionist stance. President Lula’s administration instead focused on denouncing hierarchies within the global governance system, placing Brazil in opposition with the United States and the West, whose policies were seen as impeding Brazil’s foreign policy aims, while relations with developing countries would facilitate Brazil’s rise. In this context, South-South cooperation also served to establish Brazil as a leader among developing nations and has anchored Brazil as a regional leader, a role which has not gone uncontested in the region (CFR 2011, Dube and Qobo, 2012).

Historical links with Europe and the United States were nevertheless preserved (Rios and Veiga 2010, Dauvergne and Farias 2012, Saravia 2012, Christensen 2013). Unlike some re-emerging donors Brazil, albeit wary of maintaining its autonomy, has not shied away from collaborating with traditional donors. Brazil works with DAC donors under the OECD’s program of enhanced engagement since 2007, which built on cooperation started in 1998 at the request of the Brazilian government. In addition, Brazil’s engagement in triangular cooperation arrangements has consolidated its role as a pivotal country, giving it more visibility among DAC donors and recipient countries (Abdenur 2007, OECD 2014). Brazil’s main trilateral partners are Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In partnership with other Southern regional leaders, through platforms like the IBSA forum, Brazil has also actively sought to extend South-South networks (Abdenur 2007). McEwan and Mawdsley argue that triangular cooperation, which is based on compromise and collaboration with Northern donors, might help bridge the gap between promoting Brazil’s global image and reputation with DAC donors while maintaining national autonomy and the country’s role as a major proponent of Southern development cooperation (2012).

In line with Brazil’s foreign policy priorities, the country’s development cooperation has focused first on South America and secondly on Africa over the past decade (Barbosa et al. 2009, Saravia 2012)\(^{12}\). Over 30 Brazilian embassies were opened on the African continent during Lula’s terms in office. Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa are also presented by Brasilia as opportunities to diversify Brazil’s export markets (Abdenur 2007, John de Sousa 2010, Christensen 2013, Stuenkel 2013).

\(^{11}\) Between 2005 and 2009, 76.5% of Brazil’s development cooperation budget went to contributions to multilateral organizations (regional development banks and international development organizations) (Ipea-ABC 2010).

\(^{12}\) Brazilian development cooperation long focused on the Portuguese-speaking African countries (Palop) and has diversified in recent years. “Brazil: technical cooperation agreements with developing countries: Africa: Portuguese-speaking African countries (Palop) countries, South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Togo, [Democratic Republic of the Congo], Zimbabwe; Latin America and Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guiana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela; Asia and Middle East: China, East Timor, India, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.” Saravia 2012, 129.
Due to the relative success of social and economic development programs domestically, Brazil has become a primary exporter of ‘social technology’, particularly with regard to agriculture, health, and vocational training. Brazil is an increasingly important provider of technical cooperation in these areas (White 2010, Dauvergne and Farias 2012, White 2013). Development cooperation remains highly decentralized, with around 140 government agencies taking part in development cooperation. While the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), established in the late 1980s and housed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, faces the continued challenge of coordinating the multitude of development cooperation actors and projects (on the rise), Brazil is improving the institutional set-up and systemization of its development cooperation. Indeed, as development cooperation increases, the country needs to address issues of transparency, coordination, and effectiveness similar to those traditional donors face (Rowlands 2008, Ipea-ABC 2010, John de Sousa 2010, Cooper Patriota 2011).

Brazil's cooperation model remains distinct from traditional donor approaches and, in the context of cooperation with African countries, also sets Brazil apart from other re-emerging development partners. White argues that Brazil has encouraged, and at times created, a seamless link between private business interests and development cooperation. The Brazilian private sector is an active contributor to development cooperation across Africa and, in turn, development has become central to Brazilian firms’ sustainable commercial interests (White 2013). Similar to their Chinese and Indian counterparts, Brazilian firms seek profits from their investments. However, they pursue an agenda in line with Brazil's foreign policy priorities and make an explicit link to development in their investment and talent management strategies. There is a certain complementarity between Brazil's commercial and strategic interests in Africa and the country's development cooperation (White 2010, White 2013). The Brazilian government actively encourages large Brazilian companies present in African countries to employ the local workforce, to use local goods and services, and to make parallel investments in social services for local communities directly or indirectly affected by their activities. As part of a strategy for the development of the Moatize coal mine in Mozambique, the Brazilian mining company Vale had by 2009 invested USD 6.9 million locally in health care, agriculture, infrastructure, and education. According to Vale, around 10% of the company’s overall investment was to go to parallel investments in local social services (Cooper Patriota 2011).

Civil society organizations, which in countries like the United States have become drivers of the aid process, do not yet play an important role in Brazil’s development architecture and the country has a relatively small representation among NGOs active on the international development scene. It is, however, seeking ways of engaging more civil society organization in its international development cooperation (Savaria 2012).

Similar to Brazil, South Africa is not new to the field of development cooperation. Under successive apartheid governments, South Africa's development aid served to secure political support from other developing countries and control the economically and

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13 For an overview of Brazilian international cooperation in Africa see WB-Ipea 2011, 48-49.

14 Mostly large firms in the infrastructure, energy, and mining sectors such as Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa, Odebrecht, Petrobras, Queiroz Galvão, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) (Cooper Patriota 2011, WB-Ipea 2011, Stolte 2012). Odebrecht, for instance, is the largest private sector employer in Angola (White 2010).

15 Countries receiving development aid from apartheid South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs through the Economic Cooperation Promotion Loan Fund included the then Zaire, Malawi, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, and Lesotho (Besharati 2013, 17).
politically unstable ‘homelands’, supposed self-governing black territories within South Africa (Rowlands 2008, Alden et al. 2010, Besharati 2013). The democratic transition of 1994 marked a shift in South Africa’s approach to development cooperation. Post-apartheid, South African governments used development aid as a means of repaying the African continent for its support during the anti-apartheid struggle and of repairing the damage done by destabilization campaigns of previous administrations against neighboring states. Successive African National Congress (ANC) governments have used South Africa’s development cooperation as a means of bolstering the country’s African identity, countering apartheid South Africa’s narrative of being a ‘European’ outpost on the African continent. South Africa’s development cooperation is rooted in the idea of solidarity with national liberation movements and former supporters of the anti-apartheid movement (Sidiropoulos 2012).

South Africa’s development cooperation is based on the normative priorities of promoting peace, stability and economic development of the African continent (EDD 2010). These are articulated in South Africa’s so-called ‘African Agenda’ and South-South cooperation. South Africa has also moved away from the terms and practices of traditional donors, using the discourse of partnership rather than donor and rejecting the use of conditionality (Sidiropoulos 2012, Besharati 2013). In 2004, the National Treasury estimated that 87% of South African transfers to African countries were through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), placing South Africa at the top of the donor list for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland (Chahoud 2008, Rowlands 2008, Sidirooulos 2012, Besharati 2013). South Africa’s development cooperation spans support for regional integration and projects in the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), conflict resolution and conflict management initiatives, state capacity building with a focus on democratization, good governance and education, infrastructure development and customs and trade arrangements (Rowlands 2008, Sidirooulos 2012, Besharati 2013). South Africa has funded in projects ranging from building the Mokhotlong Road linking Lesotho to the port of Durban and the Metolong Dam in Lesotho, to water supply schemes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to the preservation of manuscripts in Timbuktu and debt relief to Cuba. Individual ministries also cooperate with their counterparts across the continent through training and technical support. The South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development runs projects in Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Sudan, and the DRC while the Department of Education has support programs with Swaziland, Zambia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Mali, and Lesotho. South Africa has also worked on triangular cooperation projects with Vietnam as well as traditional donors like Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Germany, France and the UK. The latter have tended to focus on post-conflict rebuilding (Sidirooulos 2012).

South Africa places the emphasis on multilateralism both outside the continent, through the BRICS and IBSA forums or UN agencies and the World Bank, and in Africa, playing a pivotal role in the creation of institutions like the African Union, the NEPAD, the Pan-African Parliament as well as sub-regional bodies like the Development Bank of Southern Africa and the SACU (Alden and Schoeman 2013). According to Dube and Qobo, South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism is both defensive and proactive, seeing multilateral forums as spaces within which the interests of smaller states can be protected and a rebalancing of global governance can take place (2012). Working through multilateral channels has also been a means of mitigating perceptions of being a regional hegemon as South Africa’s engagement at the regional or continent level is at time still met with skepticism (Adebajo 2007, Sidirooulos 2012).

The heretofore lack of coordination of South Africa’s development cooperation lead to the decision in 2011 to establish the South African Development Partnership Agency
(SADPA). The aim of the agency is to coordinate, track, and evaluate South Africa’s development cooperation. In addition to its coordination role, SADPA is meant to bolster South Africa’s role as a pivotal country, acting as a bridge or broker between traditional donors and re-emerging donors on the one hand and African countries on the other, a role which is further bolstered by South Africa’s engagement in triangular cooperation (Sidiropoulos 2012, Besharati 2013).

Debates in South Africa currently focus on balancing self-interest and normative imperatives. In recent years, South African administrations have been under increased pressure to include private sector priorities in development cooperation. This is directly linked to the feeling that South Africa’s contribution to stability on the continent should have direct rather than indirect benefits for the country. There is a growing sense of frustration in South Africa that, in a number of instances, external partners have directly profited from South Africa support of peace, stability and post-conflict reconstruction, with new markets going to European, Brazilian, Indian, Chinese, and Arab companies (Sidiropoulos 2008, Alden and Schoeman 2013, Besharati 2013). Triangular cooperation, mostly with donors from Europe, has enabled South Africa to lower the cost of its engagement on the continent and scale up development projects. It has also increased South Africa’s profile as a provider of SSC while mitigating the risk of being accused of dominating African affairs (Rowlands 2008, McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). Decreasing funding for civil society organizations, including diminishing aid from traditional donors has weakened South Africa’s NGO community. Some NGOs have been direct implementers of South African development cooperation on the continent through the African Renaissance Fund. Besharati argues that despite Pretoria’s general openness to engage NGO groups, the lack of effective coordination mechanisms has been a great challenge (2013).

5. Moving Forward: Potential for the Atlantic Basin

From Northern traditional donors to Least Developed Countries, emerging powers to middle- and lower-income countries, the Atlantic space has the specificity of encompassing actors from the spectrum of development cooperation. Through cooperation, competition, and coordination, the Atlantic basin has the potential to become a driver for novel approaches to development cooperation away from the persisting North-South and South-South cooperation distinctions. Beneath the surface of these broad dividing lines lies a diversity of approaches, aims, and strategies which could lead to the emergence of ‘coopetition’ between development actors, whereby they compete and cooperate simultaneously depending on geography, policy area, and interest. While greater competition between donors has increased the maneuvering room of many partner countries, greater cooperation between traditional donors and re-emerging development is not always welcomed by partner countries as it decreases the latter’s leverage in negotiations (Kragelund 2008, Mawdsley 2012). The increased maneuvering room of African countries, for instance, rests in large part on the challenge that re-emerging development partners pose to the power base of traditional donors on the continent (Kragelund 2011). Development providers will be lead to compete for markets among Atlantic actors as well as against countries outside of the basin such as China, Indonesia, India or Malaysia, all the while cooperating through triangular cooperation in areas where interests and capacity can be complementary. In these more dynamic and flexible arrangements, the Atlantic basin can become an

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16 The term was first coined by Ray Noorda, founder of Novell, and later popularized by Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff in Co-opetition published in 1996.
incubator for innovative approaches to development cooperation and a driver of the debates on the global aid architecture.

In light of the multiplicity of channels for the delivery of development aid and the difficulties of cooperation, development actors should strive for development coordination as a more feasible endeavor (Woods 2011). Coordination does not entail planning and delivering aid jointly to achieve a common goal but rather organizing activities in a way that will not impede efforts by other actors and will lower the cost of the multiplicity of donors (duplication, waste, overwhelming local capacity) but sharing information on who is doing what, where, and when activities are being planned (Davies 2010, Chandy and Kharas 2011, Woods 2011). In this respect, development partners should make use of the myriad representations countries have around the Atlantic basin. Indeed the bilateral embassies, multilateral representations (UN, WB and IMF offices, or EU delegations), offices of national development agencies, international NGOs, which make up a vast network across the Atlantic, should be strongly encouraged to systematically coordinate at country level. Evidence shows that the much touted gap between the actions of re-emerging development partners, especially those who do not formally adhere to DAC norms, and the actions of tradition donors is not as wide as is often assumed. Both are concerned with the effectiveness of their development cooperation (Chandy and Kharas 2011, Woods 2011). Given the limited clout of recipient countries during multilateral consultations and negotiations, a local coordination process could increase the aid receiving country’s ability to lead the process, ensuring that national priorities and needs are met, information is shared, the approaches used are appropriate for the country, and the costs of non-coordination are minimized. Country-level coordination would also enable southern providers to avoid the appearance of aligning too closely to Northern-dominated norms.

A number of areas stand out for more systematic policy dialogue and lessons learned. While old and re-emerging development providers tend to emphasize the normative dimensions (and differences) of the cooperation with partner countries, areas for policy dialogue and trust building exist (Hyden 2008, Davies 2010, Chaturvedi et al. 2012). According to Mackie, the traditional, mostly European, development sector tends to be defensive toward re-emerging development partners. European development providers are wary of southern partners discarding decades’ worth of practical knowledge and specialized expertise as well as established institutions. In practice, however, re-emerging partners, who are also concerned with good results and are at the beginning of their learning curve, are interested in lessons learned by traditional partners (2012). Advances made by South-South providers in including the private sector as donor, implementer, and beneficiary of development cooperation can contribute to ongoing debates among traditional donors about the role of the private sector. Discussing the link between Brasilia’s development priorities and the agenda of Brazilian firms abroad or learning from Pretoria’s experience of public–private partnerships (PPPs) and South African firms’ strong record of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social investment (CSI) are but a few possibilities (Besharati 2013, White 2013). As re-emerging development partners grow their development programs, capitals will increasingly be faced with issues of coordination and transparency. Rowlands suggests that the current, dispersed, arrangements will make way for centralized agencies along the lines of traditional donor agencies (2008). In this context (Atlantic) southern providers should encourage consultation exercises like the ones lead by South African representatives ahead of the creation of SADPA (Besharati 2013).

17 “Representatives from DIRCO, the Treasury, parliament and other government departments travelled across the world to learn about various models, operational and management approaches, institutional arrangements and legislative frameworks that governed some of the most seasoned development agencies from other countries. Study tours were arranged to see
South Africa’s ‘value-added’ approach to aid allocation from traditional donors and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)’s proactive coordination of donor activities can inform discussions on increasing the ownership of recipient countries. The systematic dialogue and cooperation between government actors and civil society representatives, which has become a central part of EU-funded development cooperation projects in South Africa, could also be extended to other countries around the Atlantic basin. A number of re-emerging development partners are unable to provide a comprehensive overview of their development cooperation due to a lack of coordination as well as significant gaps in evaluation and data collection. Cooperation on data reporting and evaluation should be another area for policy dialogue between development actors, providers and recipients alike as it is central to informed policy decisions and strategies. The linguistic links between countries around the Atlantic basin should facilitate dialogue in this space.

6. Conclusions

With the Development Assistance Committee as a central institution, the international aid architecture has undergone tremendous change over the past decade, departing from over forty years of North-dominated development policies to include a new set of development actors. The DAC broadened membership to policy dialogues to re-emerging development partners and incorporated core principles of South-South cooperation to declarations like the Busan Partnership Agreement. Traditional donors are starting to develop strategies to engage with re-emerging development partners and the growing importance of southern cooperation has led to discussions in the North on broadening the definition of development cooperation, looking at the links with other policy areas like trade and investment. As re-emerging development partners increase their development cooperation, they too face some of the issues traditional donors contend with such as evaluation, transparency, centralization, or changing perceptions of their presence in recipient countries. While efforts by traditional donors have successfully extended mechanisms and agreements to include a significant number of middle-income countries, it is unclear how profound the impact of re-emerging development partners will be on the international aid regime.

The Atlantic basin provides a particularly interesting space within which to look at changes in development cooperation given the diversity of actors it brings together. While the line is often drawn between North and South, the Atlantic points to the need for more nuanced approaches, especially in light of an increasingly diverse global South, within which interests do not always align. Emerging powers have been more openly critical of the current aid architecture than many other middle-income countries, like Mexico or Colombia, who have been willing to actively join discussions under the umbrella of existing organizations such as the DAC. Moreover, while coordination generally benefits recipient countries, they have been wary of increased cooperation between traditional donors and southern providers, seeing the maneuvering room created by competition among aid providers diminish.

Northern agencies in Japan, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, France, the US, as well as other emerging countries such as Korea, Mexico, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic. South African officials have been exposed to some of the most experienced development agencies such as DFID and the GIZ, progressive models such as the ones of NORAD and New Zealand, and some of the Southern countries with similar contexts like Brazil and India. Special attention was given to models of development assistance in post-conflict environments, as this is particularly relevant to the African context.” (Besharati 2013, 34).
Increased interaction among Atlantic development partners, whether through cooperation, coordination, or competition, is unlikely to be crystalized into a new institutional set-up but will rather become the sum of dynamic and flexible arrangements reflecting the diversity of actors, interests, and strategies. In this regard the Atlantic basin has the potential to drive development norms and practices and global discussions on development cooperation and breakdown the North-South and South-South dichotomies. At the policy level, the Atlantic basin brings together a wealth of expertise which, building on linguistic links, could be leveraged through more systematic dialogue and consultation. The coming years will tell the extent to which development actors are able to seize the opportunities provided by the Atlantic space.
7. References


